Government Policy and the Evolution of the Market for Dutch Daily Newspapers by van Kranenburg, H.L. & Pfann, G.A.
  
 
Government Policy and the Evolution of the Market for
Dutch Daily Newspapers
Citation for published version (APA):
van Kranenburg, H. L., & Pfann, G. A. (2002). Government Policy and the Evolution of the Market for
Dutch Daily Newspapers. De Economist, 150, 233-250. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016186310698
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2002
DOI:
10.1023/A:1016186310698
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET FOR
DUTCH DAILY NEWSPAPERS ***
BY
HANS L. VAN KRANENBURG* AND GERARD A. PFANN**
Summary
This paper investigates whether governments can change market structures through interventions. We
study the effects of four political events over the life cycle of the market for daily newspapers in the
Netherlands. We find that policy measures meant to lower entry barriers in an expanding industry
created new entry and increased survival chances for potential entrants and incumbent newspapers.
Exit barrier enhancing policies to reduce concentration tendencies have not been successful.
Key words: daily newspapers, entry, exit, industry evolution, political events, survival
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the influence of four political events on the development of
the market for daily newspapers in the Netherlands. In 1848, freedom of the press
was incorporated into the new Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
This initiated the development of the Dutch newspaper industry. The second po-
litical event was the 1869 special tax cut. The abolition of this stamped paper
duty removed the last obstacle to economic press freedom. The tax repeal sub-
stantially reduced the newspaper production costs which caused the number of
newspapers to grow by fifty percent in the two years thereafter. The third politi-
cal event is World War II. This period of turmoil caused a reversion in the in-
dustry’s life cycle. During the pre-war period from 1848 onwards the market ex-
panded in the number of available dailies, whereas after the war the expansion
ended and the number of newspapers steadily declined. In reaction to the con-
centration tendency the Dutch government decided to install a press relief fund in
1971. The fund’s goal was and is to save pluralism of daily newspapers. The
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creation of the press relief fund, which still exists today, is the fourth political
event that affected the development of the industry.
We conduct an empirical analysis, allowing for political events to explain the
entry and survival chances of daily newspapers in the Netherlands to obtain a
thorough understanding of the influence of the government on the market struc-
ture. Duration models are the most appropriate method to investigate the influ-
ence of the political events and the industry dynamics on the duration depen-
dence of the newspapers’ survival chances Carroll and Delacroix 1982 and
Hannan and Freeman 1989. The data set we analyzed contains annual infor-
mation on every Dutch daily newspaper that existed between 1848 and 1997. Be-
sides duration and political events, the main determinants of the survival chances
of daily newspapers include the evolution of the newspaper market segments, lo-
cation choices, the development of the average subscription price, and the age of
the industry.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief theoretical
background of the dynamics of markets. Section 3 presents summary information
on the Dutch daily newspaper industry in general and details the effects of the
four events on entry and survival rates. Section 4 presents the data and the econo-
metric method used in this study and section 5 discusses the outcomes of our
empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Schumpeter 1934 noted that the fittest firms in an industry are those that gain
competitive advantages through innovations, or early adoption of a new product
or process. Survival chances depend on the actual firm behaviour and the char-
acteristics of competitive environment, or as Nelson and Winter 1974 pointed
out, ‘the selection environment is at once the medium through which exogenous
influences are transmitted to the firms in the sector: and the medium through
which the firms of the sector influence each other’. Entry rates vary over time,
come in waves, and often peak early in the life of an industry. These waves of
entry tend to contain different types of firms. High rates of entry are often asso-
ciated with high rates of innovative activities and increases in efficiency Geroski
1995. However, empirical literature shows that generally entrants are not the
major source of innovation in an industry, but that entry stimulates incumbents’
innovative activities see e.g., Baldwin and Gorecki 1991. Entry plays an im-
portant role in shaping the industry structure in certain phases of the industry life
cycle at precisely those times when the current activities of incumbents are most
out of line with exogenous changes in costs and demand. Entry is easy, but to
survive is difficult. It is a stylised fact that the survival chance of most new firms
is low. Geroski 1995 recognized that even for successful entrants it may take
more than a decade to achieve a size comparable to the average incumbent.
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In the industrial organization literature, models of industry evolution are de-
veloped to reflect the selection mechanism on the nature of industry evolution
see e.g., Jovanovic 1982, Winter 1984, and Klepper 1996. These models
predict that the longer a firm remains in the market the more it learns about its
true costs and its relative efficiency and the less likely it is to fail. One group of
extensions of these industry evolution models shows how chance events and exo-
genous factors influence the number of potential entrants to the industry see e.g.,
Klepper and Graddy 1990. Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994 modelled the in-
fluence of precipitating events, such as major exogenous changes, on the market
structure. Firms that are able to adjust to the new environment early are likely to
survive, while the slow movers are forced out of the market.
Another research field, organizational ecology, has also studied firm survival
chances and the developments of the market. Organization ecology studies show
that entry and exit rates of organizations are strongly influenced by environmen-
tal forces, embodied in the number of firms operating in any industry see e.g.,
Hannan and Freeman 1989, Lomi 1995, and Swaminathan 2001. This rela-
tionship is formulated in the density dependence model of competition and legiti-
mation Hannan and Carroll 1992. According to the density dependence model,
entry of firms is an inversed U-shaped function of the number of incumbent firms.
The entry rate is related to the scarcity of material resources that firms compete
for. Changes in competition and environmental resources determine a ceiling for
the number of firms in a market Hannan and Freeman 1977.
Evidence shows that government policy can play an important role in chang-
ing competition and other environmental forces. For instance, Seade 1980 and
Besley 1989 showed that changes in tax policy substantially alter competition
and market structures. A reduction in taxation increases the number of firms en-
tering the market. Romer 1994 showed that taxes decrease the provision of new
products in small and remote markets. The imposition of taxes may increase the
minimum sales necessary for a firm to overcome the fixed costs. The higher the
fixed costs of production, the fewer goods will be available. Government policy
can also have an impact on location choices of firms. A favourable fiscal policy
and governmental incentive programmes can attract firms to establish in the par-
ticular market or region see e.g. Holmes 1998. However, Gustafson 1993
showed that the effect of government policy has no large impact on the entry rate
and survival chances of firms in a concentrating industry.
Despite the long tradition of empirical research investigation on which factors
determine whether incumbents and new firms are likely to survive, no study to
our knowledge investigates the effect of political events on the entry rates and
survival chances of firms during the industry life cycle. Political events may
change the market structure although the effects of these shocks depend on the
stage the market is in. Government actions in an expanding industry can create
new opportunities for potential entrants and incumbent firms, while interventions
in a concentrating industry generally do not lower the entry barrier and do not
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increase the exit barrier. The ability to measure the influence of government in-
terventions on entry and survival chances depends upon a longitudinal data set
containing observations tracking firms from an industry over time. We therefore
use a longitudinal database of newspaper firms from the Netherlands. Unlike the
vast majority of industries, the history of the Dutch newspaper industry is well-
documented.
3 THE DAILY NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY IN THE NETHERLANDS
In the Dutch daily newspaper market four political events particularly influenced
the entry rates and survival chances of newspapers see e.g., Schneider and
Hemels 1979 and Hemels 1997. These are 1 the introduction of freedom of
speech, press and opinion in the Dutch Constitution in 1848; 2 the repeal of the
stamped paper duty in 1869; 3 World War II; and 4 the introduction of the
press relief fund in 1971. We will first describe each event. At the end of the
section we will discuss the role they played in the development of the market for
daily newspapers.
3.1 Press Freedom
One and a half century ago, in 1848, press freedom was incorporated in Article 7
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The lack of essential po-
litical freedom, such as freedom of speech and opinion, had profound conse-
quences on the market structure before 1848. In fact, most of the early attempts
to establish a new newspaper firm were forced to be unsuccessful in the regu-
lated industry. The local government had supported the incumbent newspapers.
These newspapers were obliged to print the city or provincial weapon on the front
page of their newspapers to receive financial and political help Schneider and
Hemels 1979. The incumbent newspapers before 1848 had a huge competitive
advantage over newcomers after 1848. They had both the time and the govern-
ment support to establish a substantial reading public before 1848. The introduc-
tion of press freedom lowered the entry barrier and created new survival chances
for entrants. Hence, the 1848 event gave an impulse to the evolution of the in-
dustry. Indeed, a relatively high entry rate characterized the increased opportuni-
ties to enter for new newspapers. Table 1 presents the entry rates of new news-
papers in a defined period over the industry life cycle. It also contains the survival
rates of the newly established newspapers over 5, 10, and 15 years. We find that
in the ten years after the incorporation of press freedom the market expanded
with almost 50 percent. This result is derived from the information described in
Hemels 1969a and Schneider and Hemels 1979.
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3.2 The Repeal of the Stamped Paper Duty
After 1848, a stamped paper duty still constituted an economic obstacle for in-
cumbent and potentially new newspapers. The stamped paper duty, known as
‘Dagbladzegel,’ originated from the ‘timbre extraordinaire’ left over from the
French Empire’s tax laws installed in 1811, one year after the annexation of the
Netherlands Hemels 1969a, 1969b, 1992. The argument for levying newspa-
per taxes had been that the returns of advertisements or announcements designed
for publication in newspapers must occur on a paper format stamped for this pur-
pose. This special tax system doubled the production costs and therefore consti-
tuted a high entry barrier. As a result many new newspapers frequently faced
capital and cash flow problems after 1848. This led to a decrease in entry rate of
new newspapers in the following period see Table 1.
TABLE 1 – NEW NEWSPAPERS’ ENTRY AND SURVIVAL RATES OVER THE DAILY NEWS-
PAPER LIFE CYCLE IN THE NETHERLANDS. 1848-1994
Period Entry rate Survival rates
 5 years  10 years  15 years
1848-1857 0.47 0.79 0.71 0.64
1858-1867 0.29 0.64 0.64 0.55
1868-1877 0.86 0.59 0.51 0.46
1878-1887 0.51 0.77 0.77 0.71
1888-1897 0.28 0.77 0.73 0.59
1898-1907 0.12 1.00 0.82 0.73
1908-1917 0.14 1.00 0.92 0.92
1918-1927 0.14 0.86 0.86 0.79
1928-1937 0.06 0.86 0.57 0.29
1938-1947 0.41 0.74 0.64 0.57
1948-1957 0.04 0.80 0.80 0.60
1958-1967 0.06 0.71 0.57 0.57
1968-1977 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00
1978-1987 0.08 0.50 0.50 0.33
1988-1994 0.04 0.67 – –
Note: The entry rate is the average of the entry rates in the sub-periods in a defined pe-
riod. An entry rate is defined as the number of entrants in the defined sub-period com-
pared to the number of newspapers one year before entrance in the sub-period. The sur-
vival rate is defined as the number of firms surviving in a given year, as a percentage of
the total number of new newspapers established in the defined period.
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In 1869, the Dutch government repealed the special tax system for newspa-
pers. The arguments to abolish the newspaper taxes were:
1. the fundamentally political argument: a free press is a sine qua non for a par-
liamentary constitutionally-ruled country. Repeal of the stamped paper duty
creates opportunities for new newspapers to be set up and break down the
existing monopolistic structure;
2. the social-economic argument: the imposition of an approximately 50 percent
levy on newspapers’ gross income is not only disadvantageous for the news-
papers themselves, trade and industry suffer losses as well;
3. the cultural argument: taxation of the spread of knowledge keeps newspa-
pers beyond the reach of many.
The abolition of the tax system removed the last remaining barrier to eco-
nomic press freedom. Production costs decreased dramatically and after the abo-
lition of this tax system a large number of new newspapers appeared in the mar-
ket Schneider and Hemels 1979. Table 1 shows an entry rate of 86 percent for
the period 1868-1877. About 59% of the entrants from this cohort survived the
first five years, and less than half of them were still active in the industry 15
years later.
In 1869, before the shock, 42 daily newspapers were published. In the period
1869-1871, 21 new dailies appeared as a result of the 1869 repeal of the stamped
paper duty; 14 entered, in some of the largest Dutch cities which were charac-
terized by an oligopoly newspaper market structure, 7 new entrants appeared in
small towns with no previous available local newspaper Hemels 1969a. A
newspaper that entered as a monopolist into a local market segment generally
had a lower chance to exit than the one that entered into an oligopolistic market
structure. The new newspaper entering as a monopolist in a new local market,
earned a monopoly profit. The newcomers in already existing markets competed
with incumbents for the readership in the local market Pfann and Kranenburg
2001. Liberalization of the industry increased incumbents’ opportunities to
grow and their chances to survive because of the lower cost prices and the in-
creased circulation.1 The tax cut decreased the production in variable costs by
approximately 50 percent and was shifted almost completely into the product’s
subscription price. Figure 1 shows the five-year average real subscription price of
daily newspapers. The base period is 1845-1849.2 This figure also presents the
number of daily newspapers in the Netherlands at the beginning of each year
Ntot.
1 On the 10th of November 1868 the ‘Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant,’ a leading daily newspaper
with a large circulation, wrote: ‘Is it not an anomaly that the State spends a fortune on education,
while keeping people from decent and inexpensive daily readings through a stamp tax levied upon
newspapers?’
2 For the entire period 1845-1997 the only time series of the deflator that is available for this study
is the average five-year Consumer Price Index CBS 1976. Deflators on an annual basis are not
available for this long time period.
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3.3 World War II
The third political event that affected the entry and the survival rates of daily
newspapers was the period of World War II. The political developments before,
during, and after the war gave rise to all kinds of market changes for incumbent
and new newspaper firms. During the war, pro-German newspapers entered the
market, while anti-German newspapers were forced to exit see Goedhart 1943.
After World War II the large number of entrants were the underground newspa-
pers prohibited by the pro-German government, while the newspapers which col-
laborated with the pro-German government were forced to exit cf. Schneider and
Hemels 1979. The entry rate of 41 percent for the World War II period dem-
onstrates the new opportunities for new newspapers to enter the market. The
changes in market conditions that occurred as a result of the war – transportation
and communications – induced larger firm sizes and a declining number of inde-
pendent newspapers. These findings imply that political change and political so-
cial structures surely affect the structure of the industry. Our entry rate findings
also confirm the results from Carroll et al. 1988.
Other studies also show that shocks to the institutional environment changed
the entry and exit barriers in the newspaper industry and thus affected the sur-
vival chances and opportunities for newspapers. In Finland, for instance, Am-
burgey et al. 1993 showed that shocks to the institutional environment, espe-
cially wars and civil disorder, increased the exit rate for newspapers. Carroll
1987 showed that wars, in particular the aftermaths, resulted in new opportuni-
ties for potential newspapers in Ireland, Argentina, and the USA.
Figure 1 – The Life Cycle of the Daily Newspaper Industry, 1848–1997
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3.4 Press Relief Fund
After World War II the number of daily newspapers in the Netherlands experi-
enced a continuous decline. During the 1960s and 1970s, the market for daily
newspapers was confronted with an upsurge in press concentration, especially due
to the introduction of television and radio advertising in the mid sixties leading
to a request for corrective governmental actions. In 1971, the Dutch government
installed a press relief fund, Bedrijfsfonds voor de Pers, as a temporary provision
to protect the multiformity in the daily newspaper industry. The press relief fund
was designed to financially support the less adaptable daily newspapers that
struggled for survival. This fund became a foundation in 1974 and still exists
today. The government financial assistance exists of 1 general support like tax
and postal concessions, 2 special measures available to newspapers in trouble,
like compensation schemes, loans, and credits, and 3 specific general measures
available to all newspapers such as subsidies cf. Hemels 1997. Although the
specific amounts that newspapers receive to overcome their financial problems
depend on the circulation and the geographical distribution of the individual news-
paper, no well-defined formula exists to determine the individual subsidy. Be-
tween 1973 and 1997, the press fund paid out more than 19 million Dutch guil-
ders 8.62 million EUR for loans, credits with special facilities, and subsidies to
12 daily newspapers that struggled to survive Bedrijfsfonds voor de Pers annual
report 1995. The purpose of the press fund is not only to provide newspapers
with financial assistance, but also to encourage potential newspapers to enter the
industry. The aim, tasks, and authorities of the Bedrijfsfonds voor de Pers are
written in the Dutch Mediawet and in the Mediabesluit KB of 19th November
1987, STB. 573. The press relief fund turned out to be unsuccessful in fulfilling
its mission. The exit barrier enhancing policy has not been successful in prevent-
ing the number of available daily newspapers to survive Figure 1. Other studies
of concentrating newspaper markets have also shown that government interven-
tions to maintain pluralism in the daily newspaper industry have not been suc-
cessful after World War II. In Sweden, for instance, Gustafsson 1993 found that
government policies could not increase the exit barriers in the upsurge concen-
trating newspaper industry.
3.5 The Development of the Market Structure through Time
In the early stages of the industry the intensity of competition within a region
depends on the number of newspapers in this segment, while the legitimation in
regional market segments depends on the total number of newspapers in the early
industry Hannan et al. 1995. The regional number of newspapers will have a
negative effect on the survival chances of newspapers in these regions, while the
total number of newspapers will have a positive effect on survival chances of
these newspapers in the early increasing phase of the number of newspapers.
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When the number of newspapers nears the limited readership capacity of the in-
dustry, an additional entrant greatly intensifies competition Hannan 1997.
Changes in competition and the size of the reading public determine a ceiling,
the carrying capacity, on the expansion of the number of newspapers.
Since 1848, when 30 newspapers existed, the number of newspapers increased
steadily until World War II after which the market became increasingly concen-
trated. The survival chances for potential entrants decreased as the industry ma-
tured, and only the strongest newcomers entered the market Agarwal and Gort
1996. In the post-World War II period the number of daily newspapers in the
Netherlands experienced a continuous decline that coincided with an increase in
total circulation Dutch Newspapers Publishers’ Association annual reports. Table
1 also shows that entry rates declined dramatically for this period. After World
War II, the scale of production enlarged significantly, possibly due to technologi-
cal innovations. Evidence of increasing scale economies in newspaper industries
is also found in other countries like Argentina, Ireland, and the USA. see e.g.,
Rosse 1967, 1970, Carroll 1987.
After World War II, daily newspapers in the Netherlands became member of
the Dutch Newspapers Publishers’ Association NDP. Each year, the members
negotiated about the necessary price increases. All newspapers had to agree other-
wise no price increase took place, except when the government forced the news-
papers to increase their prices by a small percentage to guarantee the multifor-
mity in the daily newspaper market. Newspapers were allowed to increase their
prices by at least a minimum percentage, subject to the government’s approval as
long as the industry could demonstrate that total costs had increased more than
total revenues in the previous years. The collective price policy of the newspa-
pers and the Dutch government restricted the possibility of newspapers to com-
pete on subscription prices. The post-war newspaper market is best described by
a structure of monopolistic competition with newspapers being price takers that
could only compete by choosing advertising, attractiveness, quality of the news-
paper, and production. Improvements in quality and attractiveness increased the
number of copies sold Dutch Newspapers Publishers’ Association annual re-
ports. However, these improvements also increased the first-copy costs of news-
papers. Figure 1 shows that the average real subscription price falls, but in the
last decades it has risen. The opposite is true for the number of newspapers.
4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
To study the political events and the evolution of the market empirically it is
important to precisely define the unit of research. Our unit is a daily newspaper.
To qualify as a daily newspaper, a periodical has to satisfy a few criteria. These
requirements are composed from the criteria defined by Carroll 1987 and
Kranenburg et al. 1998. Daily newspapers have to be published 6 days per week
and have to be available to anyone willing to pay the price, regardless of class or
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special interest. The content of a daily newspaper should consist of recent infor-
mation of interest to a general public. Hence, special-interest newspapers such as
business publications are excluded from the data. Finally, each newspaper has its
own market segment and reader public within the Netherlands. We consider the
entry date for a newspaper to be the year in which the first publication appeared,
and the exit date to be the year in which a newspaper title does not exist in name
anymore, and when it has lost its identity at the same time. In our definition if a
newspaper horizontally merges with one or more newspapers, then one newspa-
per survives, while the others exit. In constructing the life histories in this way,
we maintain any historical relationships and the existing demands remain embod-
ied in the market with a horizontal merger.
In total we have observed 261 daily newspaper publications in the Nether-
lands for the period between 1848 and 1997. Median duration and average age of
newspapers in the market are 35 and 48 years respectively. The data set used in
this paper is an extension of the one that was used by Kranenburg, Palm, and
Pfann 1998. We have collected additional information about the newspapers,
such as subscription prices, location characteristics, and market density. These var-
iables vary through time and are collected on an annual basis. The focal point of
the current study is to investigate the role of the government and the effect of the
dynamics in determined factors on the entry and exit decisions and the duration
of newspapers. We use a duration analysis to analyze the relationships between
daily newspaper survival chances and explanatory variables such as political
events, and the evolution of the newspaper industry see also Agarwal and Gort
1996 and Audretsch and Mahmood 1995. The explanatory variables in the
analysis of duration of a newspaper include the total number of newspapers in
the industry at the beginning of each year Ntot, the average annual real sub-
scription price of all daily newspapers Price, the age of the industry Tind, and
regional market structure characteristics represented by the number of newspaper
titles in the main appearance regioni3 of the newspaper in the Netherlands at
the beginning of each year that the newspaper appeared in the industry Nre-
gioni.4 The final group of explanatory variables is the four political events.
First, we model the effect of the 1848 constitutional change of press freedom in
the Netherlands. Incum48 indicates whether a newspaper existed at the time free-
dom of speech, opinion, and press was written in the Constitution in 1848, and
the variable Enter48 indicates the newspapers that entered the market in the
period 1848-1850 in response to the liberalization of the press in 1848. The sec-
ond group of variables measures the effect of the 1869 repeal of the stamped
3 The definition of the regions in our study is based on the classification that is published by the
Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. The four regions are composed from the twelve provinces: North
Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe, East Gelderland, Overijssel, and, since 1986, Flevoland, South
Noord-Brabant, and Limburg, and West Utrecht, Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, and Zeeland.
4 The three variables representing the other regions where the newspaper does not appear have val-
ues of zero.
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paper tax on the survival chances of new entrants. We divide entrants into two
groups: newspapers that emerged immediately after the 1869 tax cut as monopo-
lists in small local market segments Mono69 and those entering into local oli-
gopolies Oligo69. The variables InWW2 indicating if a newspaper was forced
to exit the market during World War II and PastWW2 indicating if a newspaper
entered the market in the aftermath of World War II in 1945-1946 act to mimic
the effect of World War II on the survival chances of newspapers. Fund71 mea-
sures the effect of the last political event. It indicates whether a newspaper ap-
peared between 1972 and 1995, the period of the press relief fund in this sample.
Ideally, we would like to use more detailed firm-level data, but unfortunately these
are not available over the life cycle period.
An appropriate method to describe survival and exit rates is an exponential
relationship between duration and the hazard rate. The hazard rate, ht, is de-
fined as the rate at which age newspapers cease production given that they pro-
duce until time t see e.g. Kiefer 1988 and Lancaster 1990. Hence, the haz-
ard rate at time t is specified as:
ht  limdt→ 0
Prexit t, t dt | no exit by t
dt
1
where Pr . is the probability of a newspaper experiencing exit from the market
between t  dt, conditional on being in the market up to t. A natural model with
duration dependence, often used in duration analyses, is the Gompertz hazard rate
model that uses a measure of duration time as proxy variable for unobserved or
latent factors see e.g., Carroll and Delacroix 1982. In the Gompertz hazard
rate model the unobserved or latent variable, like learning by doing, increases
linearly over the duration t a firm spends in the industry origin state. This leads
to a monotonic declining or increasing Gompertz hazard rate. Duration depen-
dence is negative if the hazard rate, ht, decreases with the age of a newspaper,
t, dht / dt  0, implying that the exit probability reduces with the duration of
a newspaper being in the market. Vice versa, if dht / dt  0, duration depen-
dence is positive, increasing the exit probability of a newspaper with age. The
explanatory variables included in the hazard rate model vary over the lifetime of
a newspaper. Formally, we parameterize the Gompertz hazard rate model as fol-
lows
ht  expX*expt , 2
where X is a vector of the explanatory variables,  is an associated vector of
coefficients, and  is the duration dependence parameter see e.g., Blossfeld and
Rohwer 1995. If   0 then the model is monotonically increasing with age
and it has a negative age dependence when   0. Because most of the explana-
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tory variables vary over time, each year for a newspaper is recorded as an inter-
val, and the explanatory variables are updated on an annual basis. We estimate
the model using a maximum likelihood method within the TDA Transition Data
Analysis statistical program Rohwer 1994. When interpreting results, the co-
efficient indicates the effect that a variable, ceteris paribus, has on the hazard
rate for a newspaper. A negative coefficient indicates that an increase in that par-
ticular variable decreases the hazard rate. One should recognize that a negative
sign of a coefficient indicates that an increase in the variable corresponds with an
increased survival chance.
5 RESULTS
The entire period: 1848-1997
The first column of Table 2 shows the estimation results of the hazard model for
the entire period 1848-1997. We find that the industry age affects the survival
chances of newspapers significantly. The industry age effects, TInd and TInd2,
show that the survival chances of individual newspapers increase during the pre-
World War II period, while the industry age has a contrary effect on the survival
chances after the war. The quadratic function of industry age has its minimum at
age 83 corresponding to the year 1931. This finding indicates that entrants be-
fore 1931 had better survival chances than the newspapers after this year. Fur-
thermore, the estimation result also shows that the total number of newspapers in
the industry influences the survival chances of newspapers significantly. From this
we conclude that the survival chances of newspapers change with the evolution
of the market structure and with the industry’s age. The majority of the param-
eter estimates of the variables representing an event in the growing stage differ
statistically from zero. The political developments during the war also affected
the market significantly. The variable InWW2 represents the first part of the effect
of World War II, and its coefficient estimate indicates that incumbent newspapers
that could appear in the unchanged situation were forced out of the market now.
The empirical findings show that the evolution of the daily newspaper market
has a turning point around World War II. It is therefore interesting to test the
effects of the explanatory variables on the survival chances of newspapers in the
Netherlands before and after the turning period separately.
The early period: 1848-1944
The second column in Table 2 shows the results for the period 1848 until 1944.
Survival chances of individual newspapers are influenced by two political events.
The first political event that changed the market structure was the liberalization
of the press in 1848 when the regulated market transformed into a competitive
one. The variable Incum48 indicates whether a newspaper existed at the time of
the liberalization of the press in 1848. It captures the newspaper market domi-
nance by first-movers. The negative coefficient estimate points at the fact that
244 H.L. VAN KRANENBURG AND G.A. PFANN
TABLE 2 – ESTIMATION OF HAZARD RATE MODELS FOR DAILY NEWSPAPERS
The entire period:
1848-1997
The early period:
1848-1944
The late period:
1945-1997
Effect of
Press Freedom 1848
Incum48 2.0132* 0.8466 1.7833 0.9498 0.1819 0.5986
Enter48 1.4627 0.7963 0.7106 0.8738
Effect of
Tax Repeal 1869
Mono69 1.1623 0.5934 1.4033 0.7261 1.1813 1.0269
Oligo69 0.4781 0.3062 0.2905 0.3328 1.3105 0.7536
Effect of
World War II
InWW2 5.1981* 0.2443
PastWW2 0.4146 0.2284 0.2763 0.2532
Effect of
Relief Fund 1971
Fund71 0.3659 0.5131 3.5780* 1.4565
Other Explanatory
Variables
Constant 2.1971 2.1154 3.5455 3.2935 0.9203 21.0390
Price 0.1955 0.1291 0.3585* 0.1656 2.8861* 0.6896
Price2 0.0013 0.0038 0.0123* 0.0045 0.0826* 0.0218
Ntot 0.2060* 0.0702 0.1219 0.1067 0.4734* 0.1666
Ntot2 /1000 0.8763* 0.3460 1.3070* 0.5939 2.5963* 0.8936
NNorth 0.1960 0.3027 0.7264* 0.3484 0.0021 0.9841
NNorth2 /1000 0.0068 0.0180 0.0497 0.0261 0.0014 0.0471
NEast 0.2170 0.1393 0.7020* 0.2274 0.0125 0.4331
NEast2 /1000 0.0064 0.0037 0.0295* 0.0108 0.0003 0.0097
NSouth 0.2780 0.2351 0.6698* 0.2808 0.0155 0.9976
NSouth2 /1000 0.0155 0.0119 0.0394* 0.0192 0.0046 0.0456
NWest 0.0626 0.0594 0.1639* 0.0684 0.0334 0.2271
NWest2 /1000 0.0006 0.0006 0.0023* 0.0010 0.0007 0.0024
TInd 0.2880* 0.0478 0.0948 0.0776 0.2010 0.4326
TInd2 /1000 1.7249* 0.2730 1.1930* 0.4860 1.2629 1.9532
 0.0066* 0.0027 0.0018 0.0039 0.0110* 0.0039
Number of Spells 12558 7865 4693
Number of Events 206 108 98
2 437.6 123.8 160.0
Log likelihood 870.9137 517.2705 433.0985
* significant at 5%;  significant at 10%; standard errors in parentheses
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newspapers that existed at the time of the 1848 liberalization of the press had
indeed lower exit chances. Newspapers that emerged immediately after the instal-
lation of press freedom in 1848, Enter48, did not survive longer than the ones
that entered at later dates.
The repeal of the special tax system in the expanding industry increased the
profit margin. Consequently, this event created new opportunities for potential
newspapers to enter the market. The variables Mono69 and Oligo69 empirically
model the effects of a tax cut and indicate whether a newspaper entered into a
local monopoly or oligopoly in response to the abolition of the stamped paper
duty in 1869. We find that newspapers that emerged immediately after the 1869
tax shock as monopolists in small local market segments had a higher chance to
survive than the other entrants in the early period. This is an interesting result.
Entrants in local small markets could benefit from the first-mover advantages in
that region, while newcomers in oligopolistic markets could not.
The estimate of the squared term of the total number of newspapers in the
industry, Ntot2, shows a significant negative effect. This suggests that the survival
chances of firms increase in an expanding industry. However, the regional num-
ber of newspapers has a marginally decreasing positive effect on the survival
chances of newspapers which appeared in the particular region. The parameter
estimates of NNorth, NEast, NSouth, NWest are negative, while the squared terms
increase the exit chances. These results point to the fact that the intensity of com-
petition within a region affected the survival chances of newspapers in the same
region.
The estimates of the price development effect, Price and Price2, are negative
and significantly different from zero indicating that in the period before World
War II a lower price corresponded with a shorter expected lifetime.
The variables TInd and TInd2 were created to investigate the effects of the
industry age on the survival chances of newspapers. The parameter estimates of
these variables show a substantial influence of TInd2 on the survival chances.
The survival chance increases during the pre-World War II period. The results of
model 2 are consistent with the increasing survival rates of entrants shown in
Table 1.
The late period: 1945-1997
The last column in Table 2 presents the effects of the variables on the hazard
function for the post-World War II period. Clearly, newspapers that were pub-
lished after the war had different survival chances than newspapers that appeared
before. At this stage the industry profit margin is driven to a level such that ex-
pected profits of many potential entrants are less than or equal to zero. However,
just after the war new opportunities arose for potential entrants. The variable
PastWWII acts to mimic the effect on survival chances of newspapers that en-
tered in the years 1945 and 1946. The positive, but insignificant, coefficient il-
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lustrates that the survival chances of these new entrants are not lower than those
of incumbents.
Klepper 1996 finds that the most successful and long-lived firms come from
the earliest entry cohorts. However, the parameter estimates of Incum48 and
Mono69 do not significantly differ from zero. The parameter estimate of Oligo69
is positive and significant. This result indicates that the effects of being a first-
mover and of the abolition of the stamped paper duty on the survival chances of
newspapers which entered before 1872, disappeared in the post-World War II pe-
riod.5 Newspapers that entered immediately after the abolition of the specific tax
in oligopolistic markets had even lower chances to survive than the other news-
papers after the war.
An increase in the average price over time points to an increase in the pro-
duction costs in the newspaper industry. The parameter estimates of the price var-
iables are significant. The survival chances of newspapers decreased, while the
prices increased. This implies that the production costs increased more than the
prices could rise. This suggests a positive relationship between increasing large-
scale advantages and survivorship over time. This finding confirms the theoretical
findings that the industry profit margin decreases in the concentrating phase of
the industry.
The estimate of the variable Fund71 that acts to mimic the effect on survival
chances of newspapers that appeared after the introduction of the press relief fund
is positive. This finding implies higher exit chances for all newspapers after 1971
in comparison to the other newspapers in the late period. This means that inter-
vention by the government did not increase the survival chances of the incum-
bents and the entrants in the upsurge concentrating market.
Moreover, our results show that the advantage of operating in a local market
segment diminished after World War II. The estimates of the total number of
newspapers in the Netherlands Ntot and Ntot2 indicate that an increase in com-
petition among newspapers reduces the survival chances of newspapers in the first
decades of the post-war period. If fewer newspapers are in the market the sur-
vival chances for newspapers increase. The parameter estimates of the regional
and national number of newspapers indicate that the market structure changed
from a regional to a national market after World War II.
The estimation results of columns two and three in Table 2 indicate that the
survival chances of newspapers change with the evolution of the industry struc-
ture. Comparing the results of the parameter estimates of the entire industry and
the sub-periods, we find that the estimates for the entire period do not explain
the differences in survival chances between newspapers in a young, growing in-
dustry on the one hand, and a mature, concentrating industry on the other.
5 The variable Enter48 is not included in the post-World War II model, because only two newspa-
pers that entered the market in response to the liberalization of the press in 1848 survived the war.
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For all hazard rate models we find negative duration dependence   0. The
hazard rate of a newspaper in the first years after entry is high and then de-
creases gradually over time. The value of  for the early period is not signifi-
cantly different from zero the large sample t-value for   0 is -0.47. The nega-
tive duration dependence is prevalent in the late period of the industry.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the role governments can have on the development of
market structures. The analysis of the market dynamics underlined the impor-
tance of political events on the market structure and the survival chances of in-
cumbent and potential firms. We considered four types of policy events: the lib-
eralization of the press in 1848, the repeal of the stamped paper duty in 1869,
the turmoil period of World War II, and the introduction of a press relief fund.
Our results show that the estimation of a survival chance crucially depends on
the state of the industry. Early in the history of the expanding daily newspaper
industry, the survival chances depended on the competitors in the same regional
market segment and less on the total number of newspapers in the industry. De-
velopment of the industry structure caused the effect of the regional number of
newspapers to weaken substantially. In the late stages of the industry evolution
the effect of the total number of newspapers in the Netherlands became more
important. The intensity of competition in the industry was found to be a key
variable in explaining chances of survival. Our findings also show that the po-
litical events have changed the market structure significantly. Liberalizing the
daily newspaper industry increased competitiveness in the Netherlands, indeed.
The entry barrier lowering policy in an expanding industry provided opportuni-
ties to enter for potential entrants. The abolition of the stamped paper duty re-
moved the last obstacle to economic press freedom in 1869. We find that news-
papers that emerged immediately after the 1869 tax cut as monopolists in small
local market segments survived longer. However, their advantages reduced over
time, and eventually disappeared after World War II. The third event that affected
the entry and survival chances of newspapers significantly was the turmoil period
of World War II. Most importantly, the technological changes that resulted from
World War II changed the market from a geographically partitioned market to a
nation-wide market. This structural change caused a turning point in the indus-
try’s life cycle. The introduction of a press relief fund in 1971 did not have the
proposed effect. Government interventions may have delayed the concentration
process in the newspaper industry, but did not stop it. The exit barriers remained
very low after World War II.
To further increase insight into the economies and dynamic evolution of the
industry and the structure of markets, we recommend obtaining more detailed in-
formation which will explain the entire industry life cycles more precisely. Stud-
ies of the development of increasing scale economies in industries are needed to
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obtain a thorough understanding of the economies that underlie the survival pos-
sibilities of firms when concentration persists. The fact that the original local mar-
ket structure is imperative for an entrant’s survival chances warrants further theo-
retical and empirical research on the role of government policy on market
dynamics.
REFERENCES
Agarwal, R. and M. Gort 1996, ‘The Evolution of Markets and entry, Exit and Survival of Firms,’
Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, pp. 489-497.
Ambugey, T.L., D. Kelly and W.P. Barnett 1993, ‘Resetting the Clock: The Dynamics of Organiza-
tional Change and Failure,’ Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, pp. 51-73.
Audretsch, D.B. and T. Mahmood 1995, ‘New Firm Survival: New Results Using a Hazard Func-
tion,’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, pp. 489-497.
Baldwin, J. and P. Gerocki 1991, ‘Firm Entry and Exit in Canadian Manufacturing Sector,’ Cana-
dian Journal of Economics, 24, pp. 300-323.
Bedrijfsfonds voor de Pers 1995, annual reports 1995, The Haque.
Besley, T. 1989, ‘Commodity Taxation and Imperfect Competition: A Note on the Effects of Entry,’
Journal of Public Economics, 40, pp. 359-367.
Blossfeld, H. and G. Rohwer 1995, Techniques of Event History Modeling: New Approaches to
Causal Analysis, Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Carroll, G.R. 1987, Publish and Perish: The Organizational Ecology of Newspaper Industry, Green-
wich, JAI Press Inc.
Carroll, G.R. and J. Delacroix 1982, ‘Organizational Mortality in the Newspaper Industries of Ar-
gentina and Ireland: An Ecological Approach,’ American Sociological Review, 51, pp. 323-341.
Carroll, G.R., J. Delacroix, and J. Goodstein 1988, ‘The Political Environments of Organizations: an
ecological view,’ Research in Organizational Behavior, 10, pp. 359-392.
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 1976, Het Prijsverloop, in Vroegere Eeuwen, ‘s Gravenhage,
Staatsuitgeverij.
Dutch Newspapers Publishers’ Association, annual reports, 1950-1997, Amsterdam.
Geroski, P.A. 1995, ‘What do we know about Entry?,’ International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation, 13, pp. 421-440.
Goedhart, H.A. 1943, ‘De Pers in Nederland,’ Departement van Volksvoorlichting en Kunsten, Am-
sterdam.
Gustafsson, K.E. 1993, ‘Government Policies to Reduce Newspaper Entry Barriers,’ Journal of Me-
dia Economics, pp. 37-43.
Hannan, M.T. 1997, ‘Inertia, Density and the Structure of Organizational Populations: Entries in
European Automobile Industries, 1886-1981,’ Organization Studies, 18, pp. 193-228.
Hannan, M.T. and J. Freeman 1977, ‘The Population of Ecology of Organizations,’ American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 82, pp. 929-964.
Hannan, M.T. and J. Freeman 1989, Organizational Ecology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press
Hannan, M.T. and G.R. Carroll 1992, Dynamics of Organizational Polulations: Density, Legitima-
tion, and Competition, New York, Oxford University Press.
Hannan, M.T., G.R. Carroll, E.A. Dundon, and J. Torres 1995, ‘Organizational Evolution in Multi-
national Context: Entries of Automobile Manufacturers in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy,’ American Sociological Review, 60, pp. 509-528.
249GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE MARKET FOR DUTCH DAILY NEWSPAPERS
Hemels, J. 1969a, Op de Bres voor de Pers: De Strijd voor de Klassieke persvrijheid, Assen, Van
Gorcum and Comp. N.V.
Hemels, J. 1969b, Het Dagbladzegel in de Rariteitenkamer, 1869-1969, Rotterdam, Nijgh and Van
Ditmar.
Hemels, J. 1992, De Pers onder het Juk van een Fiscale Druk, Amsterdam, Otto Cramwinckel Uit-
gever.
Hemels, J. 1997, ‘Social Contextualization of the Press: The Dutch Case,’ Communications, 22,
pp. 317-341.
Holmes, T.J. 1998, ‘The Effect of State Policies on the Location of Manufacturing: Evidence from
State Borders,’ Journal of Political Economy, 106, pp. 667-705.
Jovanovic, B. 1982, ‘Selection and the Evolution of Industry,’ Econometrica, 50, pp. 649-670.
Jovanovic, B. and G.M. MacDonald 1994, ‘The Life Cycle of a Competitive Industry,’ Journal of
Political Economy, 102, pp. 322-347.
Kiefer, N.M. 1988, ‘Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions,’ Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 26, pp. 646-679.
Klepper, S. 1996, ‘Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovations over the Product Life Cycle,’ American
Economic Review, 86, pp. 562-583.
Klepper, S. and E. Graddy 1990, ‘The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of Market
Structure,’ Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 27-44.
Kranenburg, van H.L., F.C. Palm, and G.A. Pfann 1998, ‘The Life Cycle of Daily Newspapers in
The Netherlands: 1848-1997,’ De Economist, 146, pp. 475-494.
Lancaster, T. 1990, The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Lomi, A. 1995, ‘The Population Ecology of Organizational Founding: Location Dependence and
Unobserved Heterogeneity,’ Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, pp. 111-114.
Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter 1974, ‘Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth:
Critique and Prospectus,’ Economic Journal, 84, pp. 886-905.
Pfann, G.A. and H.L. van Kranenburg 2001, ‘Taxation and Market Structure,’ Working Paper, 22,
Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
Rohwen, G. 1994, TDA version 5.7 working papers, Bremen, University of Bremen.
Romer, P. 1994, ‘New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions,’ Journal of
Development Economics, 43, pp. 5-38.
Rosse, J.N. 1967, ‘Daily Newspapers, Monopolistic Competition, and Economies of Scale,’ Ameri-
can Economic Review, 57, pp. 522-533.
Rosse, J.N. 1970, ‘Estimating Cost Function Parameters without using Cost Data; Illustrated Meth-
odology,’ Econometrica, 38, pp. 256-275.
Schneider, M. and J. Hemels 1979, De Nederlandse Krant 1618-1978: Van ‘Nieuwstydinghe’ tot
dagblad, Het Wereldvenster, Baarn.
Schumpeter, J.A. 1934, The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press.
Seade, J. 1980, ‘On the Effect of Entry,’ Econometrica, 48, pp. 479-489.
Swaminanthan, A. 2001, ‘Resource Partitioning and the Evolution of Specialist Organizations: The
Role of Location and Identity in the U.S. Wine Industry,’ Academy of Management Journal, 44,
pp. 1169-1185.
Winter, S.G. 1984, ‘Schumpeterian Competition in Alternative Technological Regimes,’ Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organizations, 5, pp. 287-320.
250 H.L. VAN KRANENBURG AND G.A. PFANN
